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What might Reiner Schürmann have to offer those of us—feminist
thinkers and queer theorists—who place questions of gender, embodi-
ment, and sexuality at the center of our philosophical and hermeneuti-
cal endeavors? In the face of Schürmann’s explicit rejection of sexual
difference as a relevant category of philosophical analysis and his utter
silence on matters of sexuality more generally, is such an engagement
either possible or useful? This essay contends that it is both. The “ulti-
mates” Schürmann offers us in Broken Hegemonies, namely natality
and mortality, are after all irreducibly corporeal traits, as are sexuality
and sexual difference. In turn, sexuality and sexual difference are both
also profoundly implicated in our understanding of and relationship to
futurity, which, for Schürmann is the very dimension of natality and
mortality. As he writes, “By virtue of mortality, the future solifies, by
virtue of natality, it totalizes.”1 Reading Schürmann’s Broken Hegemonies
alongside and through certain strands of contemporary feminist and
queer theory serves to resituate the Schürmannian topology in an alter-
nate theoretical theater, whose scenography includes such elements as
a psychoanalytic theory of drives, a phallic economy of kinship and lan-
guage, the corporeal materiality of precarious, mortal bodies, and the
facticity of feminine generativity. As Schürmann traces the operation of
the traits of natality and mortality through the successive hegemonic
maximizations and dissolutions of the Western philosophical tradition,
so will I trace their operation on a different scale and in a different dis-
cursive (yet still arguably metaphysical) framework: that of Western
patriarchy. Indeed, it is Schürmann’s own reliance on Greek tragedy—
arguably the primary instituting texts of this patriarchy—in formulat-
ing the paradigm for the tragic double bind—as the very establishing
operation of hegemony—that opens the way for this line of thinking. In
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turn, foregrounding the nexus of nomological and corporeal forces com-
prising sexuality, sexual difference, reproduction, and kinship will also
complicate and confound the traits of natality and mortality. I will
bring into focus the sexuate dimensions of corporeal existence, of femi-
nine material generativity, of sexual desire prised away from reproduc-
tive imperatives, and of kinship structures proliferating in as-yet
unthought configurations. This will allow for a consideration of the
paradoxical desolations of natality, as well as the unlikely consolations
of mortality. In what follows, then, I will read Broken Hegemonies
alongside philosophers of gender, sex, and sexuality, including Adriana
Cavarero, Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Lee Edelman, in order to
illuminate and enrich our understanding of an entire field of norma-
tively governed life—patriarchal kinship, heterosexual matrix, and
reduction of other to same—that provides the contextual stage for the
successive epochal regimes in which the hegemonic fantasms have
taken their leading roles.
Broken Hegemonies offers us an original analytic of ultimates
(dernières), natality and mortality, through which to understand the
successive epochs of Western metaphysics. While overtly drawing on
Hannah Arendt’s terminology, Schürmann’s notion of natality must
nonetheless be sharply distinguished from the Arendtian kind. For
Schürmann, natality indicates from the start a subsumption in com-
monality, whereas for Arendt it indicates the arising of what is singu-
lar and extraneous to what is already established: “Every man, being
created in the singular, is a new beginning by virtue of his birth.”2
Schürmann’s ultimates are instead rooted in the ordinary experience
“from which no one escapes and which escapes no one,” that is, that we
arrive by our birth and go to our death (BH 345). These ultimates must
not be mistaken for a metaphysical opposition; they are rather simply
the fact of my birth and the inevitability of my death; they are traits
giving rise to traction. As traits, they exert their specific pull on our
actions, thought, behavior, and self-understanding; in this way, they
subtend every element of our experience. Originary, but not grounds in
the sense of foundations, and certainly not a pair of tandem opposites—
mortality is not the simple negation of natality—these ultimates rather
form two asymmetric movements called by Schürmann “impulses” or
“strategies”—a strategy and counter-strategy. Natality—being-toward-
birth—is the thetic impulse, the impulse that posits universals through
the commonality of language. This impulse is characterized by attrac-
tion, maximization, legislation, and the appropriation of phenomena
into linguistic universals under which these phenomena reappear as
mere particulars. Importantly, natality consoles, while mortality—
being-toward-death—is the irreducible undertow, carrying us away in a
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movement of withdrawal, dispersion, trangression, expropriation, and
singularization. The projects of natality necessarily involve a disavowal
of mortality, they are structured by its denial, while mortality surfaces,
necessarily and incessantly, breaking apart the universalizing and con-
solidating fantasy inherent in the natal.
Schürmann traces these impulses, or strategies, riving ordinary life
and ordinary language, through the Western philosophical tradition, in
which they become magnified, indeed maximized in and through the
structure of the hegemonic fantasm. The founding fantasm of the tradi-
tion is the “One” of the Greeks, exemplified by the Parmenidean “it is
and it must be” and the static immortality of the Platonic Idea. It rises
and falls, expands and contracts, its reign subject to the particularizing
or singularizing pull of mortality, and then, disjunctively, a new fan-
tasm emerges for the Romans, that of “Nature,” and for the Germans in
modernity, that of “Consciousness.” These swells are understood topo-
logically, emerging from sites characterized not merely historically or
genealogically but primarily through the specificities of a language.
Language here is not so much the house but the site of the question of
being, and the fantasms are in a primary sense born of their native lin-
guistic soil. 
Schürmann carefully distinguishes these fantasms from what he
calls “supreme referents” such as the Idea, the World, God, or the
Subject. In an economic analogy, Schürmann says that a “‘supreme’
standard” would be a standard commodity—gold or oil, while an “‘ulti-
mate’ standard” would be not a thing at all, a non-thing, but rather the
“variable relation of goods to a factor that is itself variable” (BH 8).
This formulation recalls the abstraction that is the money-form, inves-
tigated by Karl Marx in both Capital and the Grundrisse, where he
writes, “its very entry into circulation must be a moment of its staying
at home and its staying at home must be an entry into circulation.”3
Indeed, the instability and variability of money is particularly striking
in moments of economic crisis like our own. The money-form cannot be
identified with gold or oil, but hovers beyond them as a contingent rela-
tion among commodities, themselves a congealed and mystified form of
labor. These “ultimate referents” that are the hegemonic fantasms are
likewise relational and contingent, representing a topographical mor-
phology, which may be unstably and temporarily filled up with the
determinate content of a supreme referent (the Idea, God, the Subject). 
In raising the question of a possible relation here to a phallic econ-
omy of language and kinship, and specifically the Lacanian Law of the
Father, certain provisos are necessary. Jean-Joseph Goux has argued
for an understanding of value as a general equivalent, simultaneously
economic, linguistic, paternal, and phallic:
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I came to affirm that the Father becomes the general equivalent of
subjects, Language the general equivalent of signs, and the Phallus
the general equivalent of objects, in a way that is structurally and
genetically homologous to the accession of a unique element (let us
say Gold, for the sake of simplicity) to the rank of the general
equivalent of products. Thus, what had previously been analyzed
separately as phallocentrism (Freud, Lacan), as logocentrism
(Derrida), and as the rule of exchange by the monetary medium
(Marx), it was now possible to conceive as part of a unified process.4
While suggestive and illuminating, such an approach risks, and in fact
enacts, the elision of important differences, breaks, and hinges (brisures)
among these various master-signifiers. The appropriate cautions cer-
tainly apply, that would require, in a longer study, meticulous atten-
tion to the specificities of historical and textual institution in their
realms of operation (that is, kinship, economics, and philosophy).
Nonetheless, Goux’s account of the metaphysical hegemony of general
equivalents itself takes place at a level of generality instructive for my
purposes here. Let me be clear: I am not claiming that Schürmann’s
hegemonic fantasms really are or are reducible to something like
Goux’s “general equivalent.” They are, after all, rooted in the existen-
tial impulses of natality and mortality of the philosophical language of
their time and place, and function according to their own topo-logic as
scrupulously described in the six hundred-plus pages of Broken
Hegemonies. The question here is rather: Might it be possible to discern
within the inceptions and dissolutions of patriarchal kinship, also
found at the bookends of the Western metaphysical project, the opera-
tions of those impulses toward hegemonic maximization, which are
traced in the successive fantasms haunting philosophical discourse?
Does it make sense to speak of a hegemonic fantasm on a different and
broader scale, a yet more fantasmatic fantasm, haunting the specifi-
cally philosophical projects of Western metaphysics with varying and
elusive degrees of determinacy? Although Schürmann resists any nar-
rative relationship (and specifically any dialectical relationship)
between the three disparate hegemonic fantasms of Western meta-
physics, if we juxtapose them—the One, Nature, and Consciousness—
we can faintly discern at the very least a movement toward movement:
from the stasis of the One, to the ordered cyclicity of Nature, and thence
to the proliferation of willing, projecting subjects of Consciousness.
Insofar as subsumption under the common in the natal operation
involves an aspiration to stasis, and the escape from the common as the
sign of mortality’s traction is a movement away, it is possible to also
discern the metaphysical project as a whole inscribed in these traits. In
the twentieth century, following the planetary-scale maximizations of
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the violence inherent in natality, Schürmann finds in the withdrawal,
dispersal, and destitution of the modern fantasm, the utter diremption
and sundering of the possibility of the hegemonic fantasm as such. The
metaphysical story is over. For feminists and queer theorists, the
diremption of metaphysics prompts the question of the destruction of
that which has subtended and haunted previous epochs, prior even to
their inception, namely patriarchy and the structures of kinship
through which its persistence is secured.
The beginnings and instituting gestures of patriarchy for the West
are indeed to be found precisely in the texts Schürmann identifies as
exemplary for explicating the structure and mechanism of natal maxi-
mizations—Greek tragedies, insofar as they stage the tragic double
bind. For Schürmann there is no better illustration of natality’s thrust
than Agamemnon’s elation once he has decided to forsake his daughter
Iphigenia’s life in the name of the city’s campaign of war. Schürmann
quotes Aeschylus: “If this sacrifice, this virginal blood, shackles the
winds, one can with ardor, proud ardor, desire it without fault” (BH
27). This double bind has two aspects: the presentation of two alterna-
tives entailing a terrible sacrifice, and the inescapability of making a
choice. Once Agamemnon has chosen, what follows is a jubilant and
passionate affirmation that effectively drowns out any echo of grief, of
regret, or recrimination. However, the excoriating sacrifice of his
daughter remains as the singularizing undertow of mortality, and it is
this that provides the very impetus for the disavowal’s exultation: the
tragic denial of the counter-law of the family in the name of establish-
ing the law of the state. Natal maximizations are thus founded on and
structured through an active and performative disavowal of mortality,
and in Greek drama (comedy as well as tragedy) these disavowals,
incorporations, and subsumptions frequently involve conflicts of sexual
difference. The result of the conflict is the establishment of a hierarchi-
cal regime securing and even encrypting the household and the place of
women firmly within the purview and limits of the mÏift.5 The
reminder, or remainder, of the mortal is marked with a feminine sign.6
Alongside Agamemnon, Sophocles’ Antigone too is a recurring leitmo-
tif for Broken Hegemonies. While Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigenia
gives us the model of tragic denial as the impetus for hegemonic maxi-
mization, Schürmann’s interest in Antigone lies rather in her strange
persistence, in the inherent failure of the disavowal or denial of mortal-
ity signified by the tragic double bind. Antigone illustrates the para-
doxical holding together of disparates without reduction that Schürmann
finds in the •k prkbuùt, the “one that holds together,” of Parmenides. As
is well known, Antigone’s familial commitment to undertake her dead
brother’s burial rites conflicts with Creon’s commitment to the state that
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bars the rites to a city traitor, resulting in Antigone’s encryptment and
suicide. The bind here would seem to mimic and repeat the murder of
Iphigenia as the establishment of the order of the city over and above
that of the household and family. However, Schürmann emphasizes the
persistence in this play of an irresolvable chiasmus in the tragic struc-
ture. He points out that Creon, after all, repents of his treatment of
Antigone in the end and speaks of respecting the established laws on
the side of family religion, while Antigone crosses over to the side of the
mÏift when she makes her final appeal: “Oh, city of my father in the
land of Thebes.”7 The chorus in turn affirms the inevitability of mortal-
ity at the play’s close: “Pray for no more at all. For what is destined/ for
us, men mortal [vkeqlÿt], there is no escape.”8 The chiasmus does not
entirely supersede the structure of the tragic double bind: There is still
no overarching court of appeal by which one might judge these dis-
parates, no means of reconciliation, and no exit from the bind; a deci-
sion is made, and the daughter, the family, the lŸhÏt are sacrificed in
the name of the law of the city, the law of the father. Nonetheless,
Antigone’s own decision and commitment also persists—and will per-
sist into the future, beyond the play’s close—as a sign of an unsuccess-
ful denial. The chorus, answering Creon’s despair, affirms Antigone’s
side: “What in the future is to care for/ rests with those whose duty it
is/ to care for them.”9 For Schürmann this indicates that disparate that
can never in fact be repressed, that requiring us to “think from both
sides” (äjcfklbÿk), just as the chorus does when faced with the mon-
strosity (qùo^t) of Antigone herself, unhappy child of unhappy Oedipus,
caught defying Creon’s decree.10 Ultimately, Schürmann will argue,
such äjcfklbÿk is our task, in the face of totalitarianisms and after
Heidegger, in our post-fantasmic condition, requiring us to live under
the sign of Proteus, even if we do not yet know how.11 Before moving to
a consideration of the consequences of this call for living beyond norms
for the fate of patriarchal kinship, it will be worth considering
Schürmann’s own observations, or lack thereof, on the gendered stakes
of the tragic double bind.
For the most part Schürmann is not concerned with the question of
gender. Nonetheless, in one place, commenting on Parmenides’ “Boys to
the left, girls to the right,” Schürmann says, “as far as the separation of
the sexes goes, it will be necessary to think about the masculine in the
feminine, the feminine in the masculine” (BH 67). A note refers us to
Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own: “It is fatal to be a man or a
woman pure and simple; one must be woman-manly, or man-wom-
anly.”12 While the feminist credentials and queer sensibility here give
us little cause for argument, there is also no sense that gender, or sex,
might be a relevant or interesting problematic for Schürmann. Rather
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it seems that if there is or ever was, in fact, a question, or a stake, it is
already resolved in advance. Furthermore, in a brief endnote found on
the very last page of the text, Schürmann summarily dismisses think-
ing on sexual difference as inherently metaphysical: 
It would be no less a thetic operation to speculate on the sexual dif-
ference, as if singularities were safe as long as one proves capable
of counting up to two and posits no longer the (male) one, but the
(female) other. Such an operation constitutes the very recipe of
theticism. In speaking of sexualities, common nouns such as “femi-
nism” can only perpetuate binary models and hence the most
crudely metaphysical antitheses. (BH 680n.11)
Schürmann’s refusal to acknowledge the ineluctably gendered struc-
ture of the tragic double bind in its Greek provenance would seem to
mark a prior disavowal, namely that of the significance of these various
prephilosophical stagings of the passage into patriarchy: the tragic sub-
sumption in the Greek city-state of a feminine order of corporeity, of
mortality, but also of fecundity and natality.13
In a very different taking-up of the Arendtian natality-mortality cou-
plet, Adriana Caverero skillfully draws our attention to the erasure of
the order of birth in the instituting of Western philosophy. Unlike
Arendt, for whom natality signifies an abstract upspringing of the new,
Cavarero insists on the embodied, corporeal, material nature of birth:
birth from the womb, from a mother—the rootedness of all of us in a
corporeal maternal lineage. In the course of her analysis of the myth of
Demeter and her daughter Kore (inspired by Plato’s allusion to
Demeter in the Cratylus), she notes that maternal power is precisely
that boundless mode of generation extending between two infinities—
infinite origin and infinite perpetuation: “Both infinities, past and
future, origin and perpetuation, always exist through the feminine.
This feminine is not an abstract form: it is a portion of infinity that
humans can sustain, and where each discrete individual takes root and
finds meaning.”14 In the myth, Hades interrupts this continuum,
abducting Kore and keeping her underground in the realm of death,
during which the earth, the mother, stops generating. The feminine
order of birth is disrupted by the masculine order of death, a death that
is “the central locus of a masculine symbolic horizon.”15 Excluded from
the secret of life, or generation, man does not look at birth but rather at
death, “and every time he prefigures his own death.”16 Cavarero argues
that the philosophic project is a masculine project fixated upon death,
and that in its universalizing impulses, in which men as mortals stand
in for all of us, and c·pft, necessarily sexed, is replaced by a neutral
metaphysics, it has “turned its gaze away from the place of birth, mea-
suring existence on an end point that bears no memory of its beginning.”17
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Birth is subsequently determined in the masculine perspective as a
“coming from nothing,” understood on the basis of death’s “passing into
nothingness.”18 The corporeal, material rootedness of all of us in our
mother’s womb is thereby obscured from view and banished from meta-
physics, which now devotes itself to an immortalizing practice of death.
Thus, Cavarero’s understanding of natality/mortality is at odds with
Schürmann’s in numerous ways. For Schürmann, natality is character-
ized by the commonality of language, the consolations of what is com-
munal and shared, and the theticism of the project as it springs for-
ward into a new future. Cavarero might say that this is a fully mas-
culinized and neutralized natality: a natality without birth, without
matter, without bodies, without mothers, without wombs, without
women. Indeed it is a properly Athenian natality, sprung fully formed
from the head of Zeus.19 A Schürmannian response might in turn
emphasize that Cavarero’s vision of an originary fecund, generative
feminine plenitude is itself a maximization, albeit a matriarchal one,
offering precisely the consolations of natality (in Schürmann’s sense),
and seeking in particular to establish a guarantee of futurity, which
bluntly denies the mortality that must eventually, inexorably, inter-
vene. Such a reading of Demeter-Kore would not be inaccurate, cer-
tainly. Cavarero, however, places the immortalizing impulses of meta-
physics on the side of mortality, a reaction formation to a masculine
obsession with death. For her, the foregrounding of death is not a fore-
grounding of singularization, but is rather a vector forcing us directly
into a totalizing metaphysical horizon—philosophy as the practice of
death. Nicole Loraux, too, stresses the uniquely Greek understanding
of men in myth as primarily mortal (_olql÷, vkeql÷, åkvosmlf), in con-
trast with other cultures (Babylonian, Semitic) and other Indo-
European languages that refer to man as primarily terrestrial or
earthly (homo, humus).20 Loraux thus provides us with an anterior cul-
tural context for the metaphysical turn toward death. Furthermore, for
Cavarero, it is a philosophy of birth and a foregrounding of natality, not
mortality, that performs the singularizing function, and that can take
us beyond the invasive reach of the mÏift and its laws. She puts it this
way: “As a recuperation of the sense of the human engendering from the
mother, a philosophy of birth has thus the main purpose of disinvesting
the concrete individuality of each human from societal totalization.”21
Between Schürmann and Cavarero, then, we have reached an
impasse, and here it will be useful to displace its terms. What I want to
briefly suggest (and we will return to this in due course) is that think-
ing natality as the materiality of birth, as embodied, as corporeal, and
as feminine, far from providing consolations or guarantees, rather
opens us to materiality in its aleatory dimension: random, meaning-
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less, and opaque—the radical sense of which, qua being, is given its
clearest formulation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “Now all things which
are generated, whether by nature or by art, have matter; for there is a
potentiality for each of them to be, and also not to be, and this poten-
tiality is the matter in each.”22 Indeed, Cavarero interprets this poten-
tiality in the Demeter myth as a feminine secret: Women have an
obscure power both to give and suspend birth.23 This power within
natality, with its potential threat to the very existence of humankind,
far exceeds the power of individual mortality: “It is not the nothingness
of male philosophers who identify it with death which provides the
measure the world, and its destiny; it is rather the nothingness of birth,
a mute petrification of c·bfk: the desolate land where even death dies of
unmourned immobility.”24
So far I have emphasized that in antiquity the first flourishing of
philosophical maximization—the rise of qÌ £k—took place on a ground,
in a context, at a site where a prior disavowal had taken place and con-
tinued to be enacted and literally performed in annual festivities: the
disavowal of feminine corporeal generativity. Such repeated perfor-
mances on the Greek stage told how the feminine (and Dionysian)
became enclosed within an lŸhÏt, subsumed within the mÏift, and came
to be governed by certain particular laws of patriarchal kinship. In the
remainder of this paper, I will explore further the specifically gendered
configurations of the tragic double bind, and then turn to a considera-
tion of how Schürmann’s thinking, alongside a feminist foregrounding
of sexed corporeality, might help to illuminate contemporary ideologies
of kinship and sexuality and their queer theoretical critique.
Investigating the gendered double binds of tragedy with Schürmann’s
assistance, exemplified by the figures of Iphigenia, Antigone, and
Oedipus, I will show how the double bind serves to both institute and
deinstitute regimes of kinship and gender. As noted above, the tragic
fates of Iphigenia and Antigone classically represent the violent found-
ing of the law of the city—of unadulterated patriarchal rule—on the
basis of a turning away from and a tragic blindness to the law of the
family and the ties of kinship.25 In both cases the daughter’s inescapable
death at the behest of the father’s law becomes the symbolic precondi-
tion for the nomological and political community from which the femi-
nine is effectively banished. The family, the household, and the woman
are subsumed in the universality of the state—no longer an alternate
or rival force, they are rendered as only subtending and subservient to
the city’s needs. But the law of the father, in its confounding, is also
refounded at the levels of both lŸhÏt and mÏift. Once the house of
Thebes has run aground in tragic exhaustion, the result is not just the
establishment of the city and the terms of its separation from the house-
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hold. At the level of the family, the name of the father, the “no” of the
father, the incest taboo, and heteronormativity of kinship are also nomi-
nally secured. In order for this resolution to take place (if it ever indeed
does), certain rendings, crises, and conflicts must first occur.
The Oedipus cycle indeed begins with a city in crisis—as in the
Demeter-Kore myth the fertility of nature and of women is suspended
and a blight is upon Thebes. The reason, we find as the drama unfolds,
is a short circuit in the order of kinship, a confusion of categories, and
the polluting miasmas of parricide and incest. The structure of kinship
itself, perpetual thesis and literal guarantee of the future, is doubled
and deformed, like the swollen feet of the king, which are the sign of
his connection with and rootedness upon the earth, E´, the order of
genesis and becoming. These structural dissolutions are worked fur-
ther upon the body of Oedipus, and in the culminating scene of
Jocasta’s death and Oedipus’ blinding, the doublings themselves are
refracted and multiplied: Jocasta bewails her twofold brood, “the bed in
which she brought forth husband by her husband, children by her own
child”; Oedipus seeks Jocasta out, calling her “this field of double sow-
ing”; he rushes on the two doors, and, finding her dead, tears off her
two gold brooches with which he strikes out his two eyeballs, over and
over again.26 This folding, an invagination in the very structure of kin-
ship itself, confounds its two vectors that must always be kept sepa-
rate: the order of descent and the order of affinity; the woman one came
from and the woman one lies with. The impossibility of this double bind
results in Oedipus, now blinded, enacting upon his own body the impos-
sibility of vbsobÿk, of seeing and of theticism as the positing of a
future—envisioning the future as natality. Oedipus thus obliterates
natality as such, and this obliteration is engendered by the folding of
kinship.27 But this is not the end of the story: Oedipus’ fate at Colonus
also reveals, however obscurely, his passage to divinity. The place of his
death, his eventual succumbing to the traction of mortality, his sacred
and secret disappearance (the sight of which causes Theseus to also
experience at least a momentary blindness), will provide protection to
yet another city: Athens. The singularity of Oedipus’ sacrificial sexual
transgression thus serves to re-establish him as immortal and (like the
taming and encryption of the Eumenides) secures the safety of Athens.
Athens itself, we might say, is the natal project, born, secured, and sus-
tained through this tragic double bind.
While Oedipus’ transgression is that of kinship, transgressions of
gender also play a part in the formation of the tragedy’s foundational
power, insofar as it is narratives of gender-crossing that led to the prior
blinding of Tiresias, the prophet who predicts Oedipus’ fate and who
stands before Oedipus as his double, foreshadowing literally and figura-
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tively the blinding that is to come. Two accounts of Tiresias’ blinding
have come down to us, both of which involve complex themes of sexual
difference and gender transgression. According to the first, Zeus and
Hera were arguing over who experiences the greatest sexual pleasure,
men or women, and consulted Tiresias. Tiresias had had experience of
both: He had once attacked a pair of copulating snakes and been
changed into a woman. After seven years, he attacked copulating
snakes a second time, and was changed back into a man. He testified
that women’s share of pleasure was nine-tenths, while men’s share only
one-tenth. Hera was so angered by his response that she blinded him,
but as a recompense, Zeus made him into a seer. In the other version,
found in the third-century BCE poet Callimachus, Tiresias inadvertently
comes upon Athena bathing with her favorite nymph, Chariclo, who
also happens to be his, Tiresias’, mother. He is unable to tear his sight
away from the vision of the naked Athena, ministered to by his mother,
and the subsequent punishment is blinding “for having trespassed all
bounds when he beheld the goddess’ naked body.”28 However, Chariclo
pleads for her son’s clemency and Athena takes pity on them. While she
cannot reverse the law of Chronos, which decrees a heavy price for
beholding a naked immortal unbidden, she instead grants him the
power of foresight. In each case, a goddess punishes Tiresias by blind-
ing, on account of the hubris of his desire, which has failed to honor
normal bounds. In the first story, he has crossed and confounded the
boundary of gender and failed to take the side of the feminine, while, in
the second, it is the boundary between mortals and gods that is trans-
gressed and punishable. The second, furthermore, evokes a queer and
literally pre-Oedipal kind of primal scene; after all, Tiresias comes upon
his own mother consorting naked with Athena (the most masculine of
goddesses and protectress of the city), outside the city limits, and is
transfixed by the vision, unable to tear his eyes away.
Like the kinship transgressions of Oedipus, these transgressions of
gender form the soil, the ground, the preconditions of the very city in
which the philosophical maximizations traced by Schürmann are sub-
sequently born. It is through this uncanny foreshadowing that Tiresias
foresees the events leading to Oedipus’ profane blindness and sacred
fate, ultimately leading, in Antigone, to Creon’s too-late gesture of rec-
onciliation. Is such a reconciliation even possible, and what might it
enable?  It comes, after all, at the close of a great story where the dou-
bling of figures, tropes, the very folding of kinship itself has formed
itself into an inescapable bind with a slew of awful, horrifying tragic
consequences. In trying to answer these questions while foregrounding
the thematics of gender, I will turn to Judith Butler’s understanding of
Antigone’s own interventions into the structures of kinship, which runs
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surprisingly close at moments to Schürmann’s reading of the play in
Broken Hegemonies. 
Judith Butler engages both Hegelian and Lacanian accounts of
Antigone: in the former, kinship and the state are rigorously separated;
in the latter, which is wedded to the structuralist insistence on kinship
as a function of the symbolic order, the law of the father is indisputable
and uncontestable. As Butler makes clear, for Lacan (contra Lévi-
Strauss, for whom the incest taboo uniquely traverses nature and cul-
ture), kinship is neither a material relation of blood, nor a social and
cultural institution, but “the effect of a linguistic set of relations in
which each term signifies only and always in relation to other terms.”29
In this formulation we may hear echoes of Schürmann’s own definition
of the hegemonic fantasm: the “variable relation of goods to a factor
that is itself variable” (BH 8). Here, then, are grounds for a confluence,
or at least a certain congruence, between the symbolic order of kinship
and language ruled over by the paternal law, and the ultimate referent
that is for Schürmann the hegemonic fantasm. Like Schürmann, who
understands Antigone as offering the possibility of amphinoetic life, of
thinking from both sides despite and beyond the natal fantasm, Butler
reads Antigone as offering a possibility of life beyond this symbolic
order. She argues that Antigone’s aberrant and disobedient action, and
even more significantly, her aberrant speech acts declaring and per-
forming her actions (“I say that I did it and I do not deny it”30) outlive
Antigone herself. In this doubling of action and narration, in the gap
opened up between transgressive actions and the meanings they might
be given, in the possibility of resignification made possible by the space
between performing an act and the scene of saying or telling, Butler
finds an opening for living otherwise, arguing that Antigone seismically
shifts through her performative gestures the sphere within which what
might count as intelligible lives might be lived. 
Both Butler and Schürmann find anti-hegemonic resources in the
very name of Antigone: äkqf-dlk©, most literally translated as “against
generation.” Butler argues that the name leads to a polysemy in which
Antigone finds herself not only on the side of kinship against the mÏift,
but also in opposition to kinship itself. In addition, she mentions
Graves’ interpretation of the name: “in the place of a mother.”31 Here,
another kinship fold: the doomed virgin displaced, dropped into a
maternal role she will never fulfill, creating a short-circuit in the repro-
ductive futurity kinship is supposed to guarantee.32 Schürmann, in
turn, stresses most literally the chiasmatic quality of the name: “born
against”/“against birth” (BH 197). We will recall Schürmann’s empha-
sis on the final reconciliatory moment in the play, in which Creon and
Antigone, Schürmann claims, switch allegiance and cross over, chiasti-
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cally, into one another’s realms. Creon is eventually moved to repent
his punishment of Antigone, and henceforth pledges to honor the laws
on the side of the household, while Antigone, in her final words, calls
directly upon the gods of the city. However, on closer examination of
the text we find that in Creon’s passage he does not actually mention
the lŸhÏt at all, but rather the h^vbpq¬q^t kÏjlrt, the laws previously
set down—thetically, prior to his decree—laws that precede him and
presumptively already function to govern him.33 The accession here,
then, is not so much to the household as such, but to what is more
ancient and traditional, to a spectral paternity rather than to any spe-
cific side or aspect that belongs to the household or the feminine. In
turn, when Antigone makes her plea to the city, its lords and gods, she
does not quite accede to the side of the mÏift as state, but remains close
to the earth, to the materiality of generation. Her cry is, “… d´t W©_et
åpqr m^qoÕlk h^◊ vbl◊ moldbkbÿt.”34 The land that is Thebes is d´, the
earth; the city is named by åpqr, the material city, rather than the
civil institution of the mÏift; the gods are moldbkbÿt—those who were
born before, in apposition rather than opposition to she who was born
against, ~?kqfdÏke. What is significant here is not that Creon and
Antigone cross over into each other’s domains, but that the respective
discursive orders to which they appeal harbor the potential for honor-
ing the realm of the other within their own terms. The ancient burial
rites are not simply or purely feminine or governed by the order of
nature, they too are nomological, thetic; the city of Thebes is not purely
an institution of men, but also a part of the earth and subtended by the
order of c·pft, of generation.
But even if this chiasm is not quite the chiasm we would wish for,
here is Schürmann: “Antigone and Oedipus . . . live the dissolution at
the core of every consolidation, and they affirm it” (BH 134); while
Butler emphasizes how Antigone is “at a distance from what she repre-
sents, while what she represents is far from clear.”35 Where are we left
at the close of the tragic cycle? Oedipus and Antigone have both
returned to the earth. To be sure, Oedipus, transgressor of the laws of
kinship, has in death and burial secured the safety and continuance of
the Athenian mÏift. Antigone, transgressor of the laws of the mÏift,
affirms in death the rites of kinship: “reverence to what claims rever-
ence.”36 Yet these scenes of encryption and the transgressions that lead
there nonetheless remain undecidable, unknowable, troubling, unfixed.
I want to suggest that we might read Antigone with Butler, and not
against Schürmann, in her unstable kinship relations, her “wavering
gender,”37 and her embrace of death, as tragically deinstituting the het-
erosexual law of the father as a precondition for the intelligibility of
the human.
69
BIANCHI/NATAL BODIES, MORTAL BODIES, SEXUAL BODIES
If this order of kinship, of heterosexual normativity ruled by the
paternal law, at odds with itself and precarious from its very inception,
indeed forms a shadowy, mythopoetic, prephilosophical hegemonic fan-
tasm, we might then trace its various hauntings at another level,
alongside but not against Schürmann, within the texts of Western phi-
losophy. And this is precisely the undertaking of Irigaray’s analysis of
the philosophical iÏdlt in both Speculum of the Other Woman and
This Sex Which Is Not One, in which she draws our attention to philos-
ophy’s strategies of “diversion, deflection, reduction of the other in the
Same.”38 By this Irigaray means the reduction of what is feminine in
philosophical discourse to a mute other, serving only to mirror and
reflect the self-same unicity of the masculine. She names successive
master-figures of Western philosophical discourse as they trip and slide
from one signifier to the next: “idea, substance, subject, transcendental
subjectivity, absolute knowledge,” and calls for their “reopening” in
order that they might render back what they have appropriated from
the side of the as-yet unthought feminine: the feminine, we might say,
to come.39 Can we also understand Schürmann’s hegemonic fantasms—
the One of the Greeks, the Nature of the Romans, and the Consciousness
of modernity—as similarly haunted by the logic of phallic dominance
and specularization of the feminine? The phallus, after all, as befits an
ultimate referent, is not a thing, certainly not the penis, but a variable
signifier, a general equivalent, like the money form, which slides and
trips from figure to figure in the broken, non-commensurate,
metonymic work of the unconscious (gold, feces, the monarch, the gun,
and so on).40 The argument here is not that the hegemonic fantasms are
the same as the master-signifiers of the tradition, but that the phallus
is a name for what persists on the side of the masculine and excludes
the feminine, marking the patriarchal kinship-and-language that is
philosophy’s context and that provides its symbolic ordering. In this
way, it partakes both of the nature of the fantasm, and of the master
signifier. We might think of it as accompanying the hegemonic fan-
tasms of philosophy, operating on a different level of magnification to
be sure, making possible the appearance of particular bodily morpholo-
gies and practices, making visible and legible certain configurations of
desire, generation, and reproduction; haunting language and in the
unconscious, but with nonetheless a structuring and, indeed, hege-
monic role throughout the epochs and linguistic sites in which Western
metaphysics has flourished and perished.
Pace Schürmann’s dismissal of considerations of sexual difference, I
want to insist that an approach such as Irigaray’s, which is attuned
and attentive to the sexed and gendered resonances of the texts of phi-
losophy, complements rather than detracts from the Schürmannian
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project. It does so by lending a dimension of inquiry into the reposito-
ries and residues of the feminine in the various discursive tracings of
the ascent and descent of the philosophical fantasms, a dimension to
which Schürmann, in his emphasis on tragedy, is arguably already
attentive. Irigaray points us in particular toward figurations of materi-
ality, corporeality, spatiality, and staging:
the “matter” from which the speaking subject draws nourishment
in order to produce itself, to reproduce itself; the scenography that
makes representation feasible, representation as defined in philoso-
phy, that is, the architectonics of its theatre, its framing in space-
time, its geometric organization, its props, its actors, their respec-
tive positions, their dialogues, indeed their tragic relations, without
overlooking the mirror, most often hidden, that allows the logos,
the subject, to reduplicate itself, to reflect itself by itself.41
This understanding of the persistence of tragedy within philosophy, of
philosophy as essentially enacting, performing, and sustaining the sub-
sumption of the feminine as part and parcel of the double binds that
structure the natal maximizations of its hegemonic fantasms is nothing
if not consonant with Schürmann’s consistent invocations of Iphigenia
and Antigone throughout Broken Hegemonies. Furthermore, I would
argue, such attentiveness to sexual difference must form an indispens-
able dimension of any rigorous working-through of the tradition that
would form a groundwork for the possibility of an an-archic life, a life
beyond norms. Schürmann’s call for living beyond a reactive normativ-
ity, living rather with insight and circumspection, must bring into
account that profoundly norm-governed realm: that of bodily existence,
arriving as it does through the nomological matrices of gender, sexual-
ity, and kinship. Such a call requires a resonance that foregrounds the
possibility of alternate bodily modalities, practices and topologies—the
precarious vulnerability, proximity, contiguity, generativity, fluidity,
and lability of embodied and desiring beings. 
From Gender Trouble forward, Judith Butler has pressed for an
expansion of the intelligible, an expansion of the livable, bringing into
the visual and political field and into legibility lives and relations exist-
ing at odds with normatively sanctioned kinship and political struc-
tures.42 Care is required here because the call for legibility has the ring
of, and runs the risk of, revivifying the linguistic and normative sub-
sumptions of natality, and the concomitant reparticularization of lives
under the umbrella of new and improved universals. In the later works
Precarious Lives and Frames of War, however, Butler emphasizes the
precarity and vulnerability of human lives, exploring the close affinity
that pertains between lives recognized precisely as precarious and the
possibility of livability. In so doing, she affirms what we might call the
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political dimension of singularization, a politics that would bring into
view the fragility of our corporeal existence and, ultimately, through
these vicissitudes of embodiment, our mortality. Schürmann, in turn,
while warning that we may only “think and speak under the fantasmo-
genic impetus of natality,” also calls us to “enlarge one’s way of think-
ing beyond the fantasied common” through the thought and speech
made possible by the non-nominative, anti-legislative middle voice (BH
631). Harking to the linguistic world of the Greeks and their distinctive
grammatical voice, neither passive nor active but medial, and asking us
to hear its resonances in our own languages and own time, Schürmann
seeks resources within language itself for the possibility for living and
thinking without norms. 
What I am insisting upon here is that attentiveness and circumspec-
tion in relation to the lived body—its drives, impulses, morphologies,
and modalities—redoubles the work of this medial language and
thought, insofar as it too draws us toward locality, situation, an encom-
passing process: the touching-touched of action that is also at once an
undergoing—what Merleau-Ponty has called the flesh of the world.43
By bringing the body and its morphologies of sex and gender, its vicissi-
tudes and fragility, its generative capacities, its impulses and desires,
into proximity with language and its medial capacities (not insignifi-
cantly, this relationship between flesh and idea is understood by Merleau-
Ponty both as chiasm and as a hinge [brisure]44), the Schürmannian pro-
ject is thus opened on to, and vastly enriched by, an entire dimension of
life heretofore excluded and foreclosed by the parameters of Broken
Hegemonies.
In the final section, I shall consider one more queer-theoretical con-
figuration that forms a striking, though clearly unwitting, response to
Schürmann’s attentiveness to the disavowals and maximizing violences
inherent in natality. Lee Edelman’s No Future takes up, in a stridently
polemical mode, an uncompromising and unapologetic position firmly
on the side of mortality. Edelman contends that the future, futurity as
such, is entirely constituted and colonized by the imperatives of het-
erosexual reproduction. He takes the culturally relentless figures of the
heterosexual family and in particular the child as grounding a barrage
of normativizing and hegemonic practices—a literalization of natality,
one might say—in the name of perpetuating a knowable, stable, eter-
nally heterosexual future. In the final section of this essay, I bring
Edelman and Schürmann’s apparently compatible impulses into dia-
logue, finding illumination through the uneasy confluence I have previ-
ously wrought between Broken Hegemonies and feminist philosophies
of embodiment, both for understanding and finally moving beyond
Edelman’s seductive oppositional dialectic.
GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL
72
Edelman asserts what he calls an “impossible polemic” for a queer
temporality, in which queerness thought through the death drive
marks an excess of something inassimilable (the Lacanian real, or
jouissance): an excessive queer sexuality that troubles and refuses
reproductive futurity. He astutely singles out the figure of the child as
that which, in our current public life, it is utterly impossible to be
against, and which is, as such, the most ideologically charged figure of
our contemporary discursive and political landscape. The Child, as the
“token of futurity,”45 may be described in Schürmannian terms as the
very representative of natality as such. Our culture’s rapturous obses-
sion with the child may be analogous to—albeit ironically and mor-
bidly—Agamemnon’s elation at his daughter’s murder, insofar as it sig-
nifies nothing more than our disavowal and repression—not merely of
the subsumed order of kinship and family but of mortality itself. As
such, Edelman identifies our investment as a libidinal, sustaining fan-
tasy. Might we venture that this maximized, irrefragable figure of the
child at least shares some qualities with the hegemonic fantasm? We
might usefully recall that the baby is also what Freud called an
“ancient symbolic equivalence,” yet another substitute for the phallus,
desired as such by the woman on the royal road to “normal feminin-
ity.”46 Our contemporary maximization of the Child thus appears as one
more reassertion of the patriarchal law of the father, in direct lineage
from the instituting gestures of tragedy, which, as we saw, sought to
secure the perpetuity of Athens through the eternalizing and unbroken
reproductions of heterosexual kinship.
Edelman’s compelling provocation is to call queers to consciously and
deliberately take up the side of mortality, to assume the death drive
knowingly, to become or enact mimetically and ironically (irony being
the queer trope par excellence) that which we are accused, anyway, of
being. In his words, we do this:
by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the
Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and
every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the
social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terror-
ized; fuck [little orphan] Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the
poor innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and
with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the
future that serves as its prop.47 
If this outburst smacks of something excessive, then that is precisely
the point. Queer sexuality is nothing if not excessive, excessively plea-
surable, according to Edelman, in that it cannot be translated from the
“corrupt, unregenerate vulgate of fucking into the infinitely tonier,
indeed sacramental, Latin of procreation.”48 And, in its structural insis-
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tence on fucking for pleasure and not for babies, queer sex is inher-
ently harnessed to the death drive, even prior to the age of AIDS. I
would add, too, following Freud in The Ego and the Id, that this queer
excess is also an excess of any simple narcissism, in that it disobeys the
Oedipal imperative in which heterosexuality and stable gender iden-
tity are simultaneously achieved through the rigorous separation of
desire for the opposite-sex parent on the one hand, and identification
with the same-sex parent on the other.49 In Edelman’s Lacanian frame-
work, queer sexuality is marked by the excess that points to the impos-
sible of the real and the ecstasies of jouissance, underpinned by a
machinic repetition that ineluctably associates it with the death drive.
Coupled with the Freudian reading, a queer sexual excess on the side of
the death drive would also function to disrupt any clean separation of
genders and gendered identifications, and unsettle the vectors that
would clearly separate desire and identification along gendered lines,
raising the specter of swerves and redoublings in the architecture of
heteropatriarchal kinship. This queer disordering of the death drive
works its interference at multiple levels: those of sexuality, of gender,
and of kinship.
Might we find any traces in Broken Hegemonies of this queer, sexual
dimension of mortality? Schürmann introduces the projective vector of
natality using the following examples as illustrations: “Founding the
United Nations, adopting a parliamentary resolution, sitting down to
start writing a book, [and] choosing a life partner” (BH 18). This latter,
choosing a life partner, is perhaps as close as he comes to considering
the dimensions of sexual life or the affinities of kinship as relevant to
the work, and it is expressed in the mode of a conscious, deliberate
choice. Here, then, we need to consider how to bring about an
encounter between the existential traits of natality and mortality
worked out in Broken Hegemonies as thoroughly conscious, non-sexual
and disembodied, with a polemic against natality and for mortality that
draws its theoretical resources from a psychoanalytic notion of the
drives, der Trieben. The drives, and specifically the death drive, require
some contextualization.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud struggles with a phe-
nomenon that he cannot, try as he might, account for in the economic
terms of the pleasure principle, which attempts at every turn to mini-
mize and release psychic tension.50 This is the death drive, found in the
well-known compulsion to repeat, to re-live in dream life or during
analysis the traumas of war, or the distress accompanying the
inevitable failures of infantile sexuality. If these repetition compulsions
are read as attempts at mastery, as attempts to turn a passive situa-
tion into one in which the subject has active control, they may be folded
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back into the libidinal instincts, the life instincts, the desire for fulfill-
ment of a wish with the accompanying release of tension. But Freud
finds in their insistence something inassimilable. As Lacan put it,
“after the restitutive tendency has manifested itself, something is left
over which at the level of individual psychology appears to be gratu-
itous, paradoxical, enigmatic, and is genuinely repetitive.”51 Freud is
thus forced to reformulate the governance of psychic life by the libido or
sexual drive in terms of a dual structure, evoking the ancient poet-
philosopher Empedocles: Eros, on the one hand, the integrative, conju-
gal, sustaining force; and, on the other hand, subtending Eros and per-
haps even more ancient and fundamental, Thanatos, the drive to
restore an earlier state of things as the aim of life. As Lacan puts it,
“the tendency to union—Eros tends to unite—is only ever apprehended
in its relation to the contrary tendency, which leads to division, to rup-
ture, to a redispersion.”52 This language will have an all-too familiar
ring to those even vaguely familiar with the arguments of Broken
Hegemonies. Are we then justified in identifying Eros with the trait of
natality, and the death drive with mortality? Is there space in the
Schürmannian account of the natal impulse (pulsion, drive) that might
accommodate the psychic drives, the operations of the unconscious, the
appearing of the symptom, that which hinders, diverts, and incapaci-
tates, despite our best conscious intentions? Most pressingly, how can
an existential analytic of ultimates be brought into dialogue with either
the Freudian account of drives, situated at the juncture of the biological
and the psychic, at the level of the organism, or the Lacanian account,
located at the level of language?
While Freud remains insistently biologistic on the death drive,
speaking of life and death paradigmatically at the cellular level of the
single-celled organism, Lacan elaborates the drives in the linguistic
register of the symbolic order. Accordingly, the death drive is what
returns, what repeats and insists, at the level of language and of the
letter. The death drive is for Lacan what “tends. . . beyond the limits of
life” and the homeostatic closures of libidinal economy.53 This is hard to
grasp. Does the libido represent a closed circuit, with the death drive as
its excess, or is it the automatism of the death drive, as repetition, that
will brook no disruption, no change, no progress, no future? Where in
the account is there room for what is unruly, excessive, what impinges
from without, and what diverts? The problem can perhaps be solved, or
rather displaced, if we consider that for Lacan the death drive does not
emanate from the subject, but rather works through it, despite it, from
elsewhere, from what is repressed and from what is unconscious, from
the Other whose place is the symbolic order: the order of language
itself, according to Lacan’s dictum that “the unconscious is structured
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like a language.”54 Without pretending to fully explicate this enigmatic
idea, it is worth noting that it encroaches quite directly upon
Schürmann’s insistence that language is on the side of natality, of what
is common, posited, and conscious. Lacanian language is, by contrast,
constitutively on the side of the Other, and this is also the side of the
death drive, of mortality. The Other is not the one with whom I share
things, who consoles me in commonality, but the place from which the
letter’s repetitive insistence emanates, always reminding me of my fini-
tude. For Lacan, mortality as death drive persists within language
itself, mostly unconscious, appearing in symptoms, saying what it does
not mean, carrying us away from sense, intention, and sovereign sub-
jectivity. Moreover, Lacan draws on the destiny of Oedipus at Colonus
to show life as paradoxically conjoined to death, and vice versa, with
speech as the medium: “[W]hen life has been dispossessed of its speech,
its final word can only be the final malediction expressed at the end of
Oedipus at Colonus. Life doesn’t want to be healed. . . . Anyway, what
is healing? The realisation of the subject through a speech which comes
from elsewhere, traversing it.”55 What is analysis after all? For Lacan,
it precisely performs the work of bringing language to desire through
the encounter with the analyst, and seen in this light, language for him
is also natal in the Schürmannian sense: “In naming [his desire], the
subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world. He intro-
duces presence as such, and by the same token, hollows out absence as
such.”56 Language, for Lacan, is thus the scene and ground, the site and
structure, through which both natal and mortal impulses, libido and
death drive, unconscious symptom and the possibility of coming to con-
sciousness, play themselves out. In the move from Freud to Lacan, note
that—as with Schürmann—we have left behind the body, its morpholo-
gies, materialities, its impulses and its desires.
Let us return to Edelman and his queer polemic against the child
and the future. Edelman proceeds by elaborating a concrete figure who
could stand firm on the side of the death drive against the architecture
of heteronormative kinship: the sinthomosexual. This is the one who
stands resolutely, “denying the appeal of fantasy, refusing the promise
of futurity that mends each tear, however mean, in reality’s dress.”57
This sinthomosexual is an impossible figure, standing at the limits of
humanity; an irremediable Scrooge proudly proclaiming his refusal to
worship at the altar of either the Child or of the Future figured by the
child. Embracing this symptomatic homosexuality is, according to
Edelman, “the ethical task for which queers are singled out.”58 It is an
ethical and political task that paradoxically rejects out of hand any eth-
ical and political call of living into futurity by fully acceding to the
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death drive, to mortality. Further, and once again we can observe an
accordance with Schürmann: The sinthome is beyond the logic of mere
negation, but remains resolutely in the space of the inassimilable,
excessive residue; it “refuses the Symbolic logic that determines the
exchange of signifiers, it admits no translation of its singularity and
therefore carries nothing of meaning, recalling in this the letter as the
site at which meaning comes undone.”59 With this gesture, Edelman
would seem to have carried us beyond even Lacan, and brought us to
the very figuration of Schürmann’s undertow, his counterstrategy, his
transgression, his mortality, his singularization. In this polemical space
of rejection, of the “fuck you” of the sinthomosexual, another comment
from Schürmann is no doubt pertinent: “[T]he counter and anti ges-
tures necessarily operate right in the middle of that which they commit
themselves to denying. No one is more solidly fixated on the figure of
the father, the male, or of principles, than he who claims to have freed
himself from it” (BH 514). In other words, to position oneself on the
side of mortality, to stand firm against natality, is an ethical and politi-
cal thesis that merely returns us to the non-contradictory, symmetrical
logic of the not-A that denies A, a logic that the natality-mortality cou-
plet does not and will not obey. But again, perhaps the excesses of an-
archic and symptomatic jouissance, swirling in the monstrous figure of
sinthomosexual, also may be read with Schürmann as exceeding both
syllogistic and dialectical economies of negation as the other of the
same. Edelman, of course, realizes the impossibility of his position as
position, but argues most strenuously for it anyway.
Edelman’s intransigent position on the side of the death drive and
against the thetic natality of kinship on one level expresses a certain
consonance with Schürmann’s call for living beyond norms and beyond
the double binds signified by Oedipal kinship. But while it attends to
an excessive and deathly jouissance in queer, nonreproductive sex, it
also performs its own specific disavowal of the generative, natal capaci-
ties of the feminine body. Edelman and Schürmann leave the material
capacities of the body, and in particular the opaque, aleatory generativ-
ity of the female body, out of the account, to the detriment of both. And
this is an extraordinary omission. Bodies, after all, desire, generate,
and proliferate: Encountering one another through unpredictable
defiles, normative and queer, or normo-queer, they intensify pleasure
and materially multiply in often unexpected and unpredictable ways. It
must be neither forgotten nor disavowed that these generative capaci-
ties also operate despite or beyond the normative architecture of het-
erosexuality, that materiality, existentiality, and kinship ties also move
independently of norms while ineluctably entwined with them. Such
movement is clearly evidenced by demands for access to birth control
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and the right to abortion, by the lives of single mothers, bastard chil-
dren, adoptees, queer parents, blended families, drag houses, leather
families, and other modes of living in intergenerational non-traditional
household and kinship formations. The proliferations of desires, plea-
sures, bodies, and kinship indicated here disclose a dimension of natal-
ity that is less a positive and conscious thesis than an opaque and
unpredictable facticity of living on: generativity as such, persisting
beyond norms and normativity. These are forms of life that do not
refuse the future, but that do not, either, require the eternalizing prop
of heteronormativity, nor a disavowal of mortality structured by
tragedy as a fantasmatic guarantee of their natality, persistence, and
flourishing.
Once again, we can see that the project of Broken Hegemonies is
enriched by a consideration of the vagaries of corporeity and sexual life,
and of sexuate life, as Irigaray would put it. Finally, it is necessary to
ask: Are these dimensions of sex and sexual difference expressible in
the language of ultimates? Do they condition our experience in an origi-
nary or existential way or do they remain at the level of the merely
ontic, the anthropological, the empirical? It would be hard to argue for
their existential insignificance in the face of Julia Kristeva’s powerful
words in “Stabat Mater” on the experience of childbirth: “I confront the
abyss between what was mine and is henceforth but irreparably alien.
Trying to think through that abyss: staggering vertigo.”60 This natal dis-
course of Kristeva’s is of course diametrically at odds with Edelman’s
rigorously anti-reproductive polemic, but the juxtaposition is instruc-
tive. First, it lays bare a certain ontological ultimacy, both material and
existential, in which the “I” inexplicably and impossibly becomes “we,”
“you and I,” “I and Thou,” specifically from the perspective of a woman,
and thus foregrounds an irreducible sexual difference. Second, it
bespeaks the literalization of natality in the material becomings of the
body (though let us not forget that at the heart of the natal scene there
are also the mortal bodily risks involved with physical childbirth, as
well as the immortalizing fantasies that are its hegemonic scaffold).
The body with its vicissitudes—sexual, generative, and mortal—is the
irreducible site, a monstrous site to be sure, on, in, and through which
the existential traits move and pull.
Perhaps, then, we might call on Schürmann to help us to think
through the disparates of sexual pleasure on the side of mortality and
also bodily generativity on the side of natality, without denial or dis-
avowal, or indeed the normative interpellations of heterosexuality. The
queer feminist philosophical task, then, is to bring into existential
purview the specifically feminine capacities of material generation in
addition to, rather than instead of, the excessive bodily pleasures of
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sexualities, rooted in the mortal movement of both toward singulariza-
tion. There is something excessive, a mortal undertow, on both sides
then—the side of the woman-mother and the side of the queer (who
may be in fact on the same side, occupying the same body). Bodily fac-
ticity, material generativity, species-being, unconscious desires, and
excessive jouissance—all of these irrupt in and through us despite the
ideological and normative edifices of heteronormative reproductive futu-
rity and phallic, masculine subjectivity, or the disembodied aspirations of
a neutralized existential analytic. Bodies—masculine, feminine, and
transgendered, sensitive and tender, vulnerable and precarious, aggres-
sive and voracious, loving and desiring—conjoin and disperse, and
sometimes generate and multiply. Schürmann may indeed assist femi-
nist queers attempting think through the crises of heteronormative kin-
ship in this era of the closure of Oedipus, the end of the epoch of that
shadowy and persistent fantasm, the phallus, and its concomitant anxi-
eties, circulated and relentlessly reproduced in our time in the form of
“family values” by the Christian right. Attending to the violence of
natality sharpens certain questions, such as whether and how the phe-
nomenon of gay marriage resurrects and/or displaces the law of the
father. Or how we are to think about the myriad forms of gender, sex-
ual life, lineage, and domesticity clamoring in and around the contested
space of the contemporary lŸhÏt, which in its intensive politicization
both is and is not also a mÏift.
Finally, then, Schürmann will draw our attention to the uselessness
of norms in figuring out how to think and act. A norm, in foregrounding
and recommending some courses of action as well as constituting a
world, must always rely on denial, on necessary blindness, on obscuring
certain phenomena and rendering them unthinkable—herein lies what
we might call its libidinal investment, without subscribing too rigor-
ously to a libidinal economy of finitude. Rather, for Schürmann, there
must be a fidelity to the mÏibjlt of ultimates, an awareness of the evils
that spring from such disavowals, coupled with the Einsicht (perspicac-
ity, inspection, circumspection) of the phenomenologist who, by an
attentive practice, may get through life without the accoutrements of
thetic idealizations or norms. I want to end, therefore, by refusing
Edelman’s reduction of an unthought futurity to normative heterosexu-
ality, of the reduction of the à-venir, the future as the to-come, to the
familial thesis, and by affirming the natality-mortality couplet with
Schürmann as fundamentally asymmetric, non-oppositional, as differ-
end. The singularization to come carries us away from our dreams of
progress and toward mortality, certainly, and in so doing discloses our
corporeal fragility, our precarity, but also our polymorphous, protean,
creative, unexpected ways of living, desiring, and generating, and our
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necessary incommensurability with all prior determinations. We might
then grasp toward a sort of exposure to what lies beyond normativity.
Not, this time, through the transgressions of hubris or gigantomachia
(representing natality’s maximizations and leading to a deadening and
thickening of the skin), but by attending instead to the affecting, bro-
ken, compelling call of living on and living in our disappointing, plea-
surable, surprising bodies, with and through mortality.
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